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power,' i.e., prerogative jurisdiction in the conduct of foreign af-
fairs?" we hardly have a clue. 
In The Federalist No. 64 John Jay, Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
under the Confederation, hinted that the president was not simply a 
legislative tool, but Jay was not a delegate-and the perennial 
shortage of money to pay interest on our debts was enough to make 
him, and founding "uncles" Jefferson and Adams in Paris and 
London, vigorous opponents of legislative supremacy. In short, 
anyone who claims to know that the framers would have considered 
the War Powers Resolution of 1973 constitutional, or unconstitu-
tional, is an astrologer, not a scholar. I happen to think, based on 
broad contextual evidence such as the general revulsion that Ameri-
cans felt toward "monarchical usurpations,'' that the odds are they 
would support it-just as I believe on the same basis that judicial 
review of congressional acts was part of the background music-but 
my hunches, however well-informed, would be thrown out by any 
court in the country for lack of proof. 
So where do we go from here? Now that the party is over, the 
first thing to do is get the children off the streets. To put it another 
way, we must reclaim the Constitution from the mystery-mongers 
and restore it to its central position in American political culture. It 
was first and foremost a political document-not a Decalogue, Ni-
cene Creed, or Thirty Nine Articles. Its authors were a singularly 
talented group of experienced politicians who had emerged from the 
most participatory society in Western history, but they failed to 
square the circle that led to disaster in 1861, namely, the relation-
ship of states to nation (or "general government" as they would 
have put it). 
Instead of reading the mystery story backwards, we must con-
tinue-in Maitland's luminous phrase-"to think ourselves back 
into a twilight," and eschew the temptations of retrospective sym-
metry. And above all, we should be grateful that nobody had a 
telephone-such fascinating byplay as Jefferson's discussion with 
Madison on the proposed scope of first amendment protection 
would surely have been lost rather than in the archives. 
THOMAS P. LEWIS4 
For several reasons the subject of constitutional law tends to be 
submerged in my mind by the subject of the Supreme Court as an 
institution. For some time now I have felt uneasy about the direc-
tion many of our courts seem to be taking. My hunch is that the 
4. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. 
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Supreme Court during the last twenty-five years or so has had 
something to do with this that goes beyond the binding force of its 
precedents. 
The Bork hearings have dramatized the schism concerning the 
mandate and role of a Supreme Court Justice.s Oversimplified and 
roughly defined, this schism divides those who insist on a Justice's 
seeking to find his "polestar" of decision in a legal text, constitu-
tional or statutory, and its history, all as informed by (sound) prece-
dent, from those who applaud finding the polestar in more 
subjective sources. It is reflected in constitutional scholarship. But 
what was apparent during the Bork hearings may well be true 
among constitutional scholars: the adherents-in fact or according 
to self-description-of one camp tend to tum a deaf ear to those in 
the other camp. (Of course some will keep one foot in each camp, 
defending the polestar that for the moment advances their personal 
agenda.) 
It is, of course, a question of degree. Even so, the schism I 
have crudely defined does exist within the Court. With some help 
from scholars the Justices have confused society about the place of 
the Court in our government. The unanimous result is still more 
common than the unanimous opinion, but both seem to have been 
headed toward extinction during the last twenty or so years. The 
flip-flop products of the swing vote phenomenon, parented by and 
giving birth to additional 5-4 outcomes; the proliferation of concur-
ring opinions in which the Justices seem compelled to register every 
nuance of disagreement with their fellows; the shrillness with which 
they attack each other; and the refusal by some Justices to quit dis-
senting, long after they have failed to have their way on an issue, 
contribute to an impression that they write on a clean slate.6 
Coupled with life tenure, that impression should lead to wide-
spread unease about the Court. Instead, it seems to have shifted the 
predominant measurement of a Justice's performance from evalua-
tion of the Justice's bottom lines (results), in light of his supporting 
5. While I use the Bork hearings as a convenient frame of reference, my comments are 
not prompted by those hearings but trace back to seeds planted long ago. See, e.g., Lewis, 
Consumer Picketing and the Court-The Questionable Yield of Tree Fruits, 49 MINN. L. REV. 
479 (1965). 
6. Professor Easterbrook properly notes that division among the Justices is inevitable, 
even assuming that each Justice reaches a conclusion based on a process of reasoning deemed 
legitimate by traditional standards. And such divisions are on the increase at least in part 
because of the larger number of "hard" cases reaching the Court. Easterbrook, Ways of 
Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802 (1982). This does not say, however, that divi-
sion and hard cases are not increased when some Justices rather consistently follow their 
personal conceptions of the good society without respect to the presence of contrary tradi-
tional indicators. 
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opinions, to an evaluation of or reaction to his bottom lines, period. 
Indeed, the behavioralists of the academic political science frater-
nity are so convinced of the legitimacy of this measure-or perhaps 
just of the reality of its validity-that they refrain from reading 
opinions and simply categorize results and then count votes. (It 
would be interesting to see a study of any correlation between the 
growth cycles of this movement and the composition of the Court.) 
I am not here concerned with results of particular cases; 
rather, I am concerned about the fall-out or ripple effects of a 
method of judging that, whether employed in areas where judges 
have a good deal of latitude, or in areas where there is fairly clear 
governing constitutional or statutory text, leads to excessive judicial 
creativity. And since a judge cannot admit that the driving force of 
his result is his own sense of fairness, his opinion will manipulate 
obstacles to the result, such as the standard of review, governing 
text, or precedent. When the method is broadly used, the fallout 
includes a quantum jump in the complexity and prolixity of the law, 
a proliferation of rights, and a diminished ability or willingness of 
judges to check the tendency of "all rights ... to declare themselves 
absolute to their logical extreme." 
I have referred to judges rather than to Justices, because the 
phenomena that I think I observe are national in scope and relate to 
state as well as federal courts. A movement, which I would roughly 
describe as one toward arbitrary standards of perfection, is under-
way, though it is much further along in some states and circuits 
than in others. As a people, our threshold of indignation seems to 
be at an all-time low. 
What does all this have to do with the Supreme Court? I think 
most scholars would agree that the Court has been unusually crea-
tive during the last two or three decades. With respect to the 
Court's precedents, as played out by the lower courts, I suggest, 
without pausing over the validity or value of specific results, that 
there are hidden costs that we need to think about and study. I 
suggest also that the Court has effects far beyond the binding force 
of its precedents. It is hardly novel to observe that the Court, as the 
most authoritative, visible, and written-about court in the land, is 
teacher to the country and teacher and model to the lower courts. I 
suggest that the methods of some Justices, perceived as appropriate, 
stimulate emulation by other judges. It has been suggested that the 
Court follows the mood of the country. I suggest that the Court has 
a great deal to do with establishing the mood of the country. In any 
event the hidden costs of overly creative courts relate to much more 
than the Court's own precedents. 
26 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:17 
With respect to the Supreme Court specifically: we have had 
plenty of scholarship devoted to 1) probing the meaning of constitu-
tional language, including lengthy and sophisticated rationaliza-
tions of "wished for" meaning; 2) disclosing through philosophical 
discourse the whole meaning and applications of various constitu-
tional provisions; and 3) describing, prescribing or rationalizing the 
Court's role in constitutional judicial review. Much of this is 
valuable, some extraordinarily so, but this type of scholarship will 
flourish without added encouragement. What different kind of 
scholarship is needed? In this age of accountability the aim should 
be to keep pressure on the accountability of the Court to the coun-
try, more particularly, the accountability of the Justices to the 
Court as an institution. Because the scholarship described above 
provides so much point and counterpoint, providing rationales for 
about anything a Justice might do, it does not meet this specific 
need. But what might? One modest suggestion: a renewed empha-
sis on the "micro" critique of opinions of the Justices. I have in 
mind critiques that would seek to isolate the values underpinning an 
opinion. Do they fairly derive from constitutional or statutory text? 
Text interpreted in light of original purpose and history? Are they 
an adaptation of original values, restated to fit modem times? Are 
they values drawn largely from the Justice's personal conception of 
what is good for society? If the values seem to fit one of the last two 
categories, how widely and by whom are the values shared? (Bear-
ing in mind that law governs, and generally should be understanda-
ble by, ordinary people, are the values evident or, once discovered, 
apt to be regarded as sensible in light of their common experience?) 
How do the values actually fit in with existing precedent? As we 
imagine lower courts administering resulting doctrine what difficul-
ties and results can be anticipated? One goal of the sort of critique I 
am suggesting would be to determine what it is we are applauding 
or condemning as we react to a Justice's work. 
When I scanned the opinions of the Court's last term to find a 
case that might warrant the sort of critique I suggest, I stopped 
within the first ten opinions issued, on Colorado v. Connelly. 
Respondent, following the "voice of God," insisted on confessing a 
murder to Denver police, saying that he had come all the way from 
Boston to confess. He led police to the exact location of a body he 
claimed as his victim. The issue was the voluntariness of the confes-
sion; its reliability was not questioned. A majority held that coer-
cive police activity is a predicate to finding that a confession is 
involuntary and therefore the confession was admissible. The ma-
jority also disposed of an issue involving burden of proof and Mi-
randa rights respecting a second confession by the respondent after 
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he was taken into custody. Justices Blackmun and Stevens dis-
sented on the second issue on the ground that it was not before the 
Court and had not been briefed or argued. Justice Brennan dis-
sented on both issues, for himself and Justice Marshall, saying with 
respect to the voluntariness issue, "This holding is unprecedented: 
'Surely in the present stage of our civilization a most basic sense of 
justice is affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being 
upon the basis of a statement he made while insane .... ' Blackburn 
v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960)." What is the source of this 
conclusion? The seven other Justices did not think it was to be 
found in Blackburn or other precedents or in their civilized sense of 
justice. (Blackburn, by contrast, carried the agreement of eight Jus-
tices, and the ninth concurred in the judgment without opinion.) 
Why did the majority insist on ruling on the second issue when the 
opinions of Blackmun and Stevens, on their face anyway, clearly 
show that the issue was not properly before the Court? And on that 
issue, as between the majority and Justices Brennan and Stevens, 
where would a fair reading of the precedents lead? 
Another valuable type of project would be an empirical assess-
ment of the costs and effects of particular doctrines. An illustrative 
candidate is the expectation of employment as a "property right." 
The pretermination hearing right, properly understood, that attaches 
to the property interest does not appear to amount to much. Denial 
of the right warrants only nominal damages unless it is found that 
granting the right would have affected the employer's decision, or 
other actual damage is shown. (Where lawyers are forced to rely on 
"other" damages, a current fad is to seek damages for mental 
anguish suffered by the plaintiff as a result of being denied the 
barest, and by hypothesis an inconsequential, procedural right.) Is 
the Court aware of the costs associated with judicial administration 
of this doctrine? The issues are many and difficult. A case may 
string out over many years. Judges have had great difficulty work-
ing over the meaning of the doctrine and appropriate remedies. 
This says nothing of the settlements that occur, straying sometime 
from the merits, or of attorneys' fees in relation to the scope of the 
underlying substance. 7 
There are other aspects of the Court's accountability that have 
not been adequately explored. For example, who (among the Jus-
tices and clerks) from year to year mans the gates to the Court? In 
relation to the cases to which the Court does devote its energies, 
what important cases are rejected? In this connection I have in 
7. An instructive study of the phenomenon of settlement as a case management device 
is Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982). 
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mind not so much substantive issues as the Court's oversight role in 
insuring the administration of justice in the lower courts. Although 
the Court's mandate is to decide real cases involving real parties, 
issues-not always of overwhelming importance-appear to deter-
mine case selection at the expense of opportunities to correct occa-
sionally egregious errors by lower federal courts in cases that may 
have unexciting, narrow, or non-constitutional issues, but are, for 
the parties, once-in-a-lifetime experiences in the federal courts. 
My final suggestion is in a different vein. We need more ana-
lytical and empirical scholarship on punitive damages. Such dam-
ages affect several of our most cherished ideals: a government of 
laws not of men; equal justice under law; procedural fairness in the 
administration of the law, especially in its punitive aspects; and ac-
countability of governmental institutions. 
MARK TUSHNETs 
For over a decade constitutional law scholarship has been liv-
ing off the remains of the Warren Court. Liberals nostalgic for the 
era of Supreme Court assistance in the promotion of their political 
programs grasp at anything that demonstrates the Court's present 
inclination to continue providing such assistance. Conservatives 
parade the bogey-man of "judicial activism"-such as invalidating 
the death penalty-as if the Court had not "deregulated" the field, 
in Professor Weisberg's apt phrase. The incarnation of Justice 
Lewis Powell, a very conservative judge, as a judicial moderate 
upon his retirement is symptomatic-and not a little embarrassing 
when it turned out that the views of his designated successor, who 
was attacked as an extreme conservative, were not that different 
from Powell's. 
Of course people can delude themselves indefinitely, and schol-
arship about constitutional law that treats Warren Court decisions 
as canonical and later ones as aberrational may well persist. There 
are sociological reasons for that to occur as well. The legal acad-
emy is likely to remain dominated by liberal scholars, whose polit-
ical inclinations will lead them to define their field in politically 
congenial ways. That's because the opportunity costs for conserva-
tives who go into academic life are much higher than the opportu-
nity costs for liberals: put bluntly, I'd have to take a substantial cut 
in pay to do the kind of legal practice that I would be inclined to do, 
but conservatives have to take substantial cuts in pay when they 
leave the kind of legal practice that they are inclined to do. 
8. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
